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A NUMBER of significant cases were decided in the area of commer-
cial law during the survey period. This Article discusses decisions
under the Texas Business and Commerce Code' as well as decisions
in related areas that directly impact legal planning and practice under the
Code. Insofar as possible the discussion of cases has been organized to par-
allel the order of the chapters of the Code.
2
I. GENERAL PROVISIONS-ACCELERATION AND PREPAYMENT CLAUSES
The subject of acceleration has been a perennial issue in Texas commercial
litigation during the last several years,3 and the following guidelines can be
drawn from the litigated cases. First, before foreclosing the creditor must
give notice of an intent to accelerate to provide the debtor with an opportu-
nity to cure a default.4 Notice of intent to accelerate must precede the accel-
eration itself; otherwise, any attempted acceleration will be ineffective. 5
Second, the creditor must give the debtor notice of the actual acceleration. 6
If this sequence of notices is properly followed, a court will uphold the accel-
eration.7 A complication in these guidelines results if the note signed by the
debtor waives the right to notice of acceleration.
In Cortez v. Brownsville National Bank8 the court addressed such a waiver
and held it effective to waive the debtor's right to notice of intent to acceler-
ate.9 The court did not reach the question of whether the debtor had also
* B.A., J.D., University of Iowa; LL.M., Harvard University. Professor of Law, Texas
Tech University.
1. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.101-11.108 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968 & Supp.
1984).
2. The topics covered in the Code are: Chapter 1, General Provisions; Chapter 2, Sales;
Chapter 3, Commercial Paper; Chapter 4, Bank Deposits and Collections; Chapter 5, Letters
of Credit; Chapter 6, Bulk Sales; Chapter 7, Documents of Title; Chapter 8, Investment Secur-
ities; and Chapter 9, Secured Transactions.
3. See, e.g., Ogden v. Gilbraltar Say. Ass'n, 640 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. 1982); Slivka v. Swiss
Ave. Bank, 653 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ); Bodiford v. Parker, 651
S.W.2d 338 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, no writ); Highpoint of Montgomery Corp. v. Vail,
638 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.); McGowan v. Pasol,
605 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, no writ).
4. Ogden v. Gibraltar Say. Ass'n, 640 S.W.2d 232, 233-34 (Tex. 1982).
5. Allen Sales & Servicenter, Inc. v. Ryan, 525 S.W.2d 863, 865-66 (Tex. 1975).
6. Ogden v. Gilbraltar Sav. Ass'n, 640 S.W.2d 232, 233-34 (Tex. 1982).
7. Slivka v. Swiss Ave. Bank, 653 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ).
8. 664 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ).
9. Id. at 808. The waiver clause stated: "Each Maker, Surety and Endorser waives No-
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effectively waived the right to notice of the acceleration itself because the
creditor had sent a letter demanding payment of the entire balance by a
specified time and date. One might theorize that this second notice is also
superfluous because the debtor will be aware of the acceleration when the
foreclosure occurs or when the property is seized, but this issue has not been
litigated.
Beyond the guidelines regarding notice, another major problem for a cred-
itor is the possibility that an acceleration might result in usury or consumer
credit violations because of the attempted collection of unearned finance
charges. Computerized accounting should facilitate the recalculation of the
proper interest charge after an acceleration. Failure to recalculate interest
continues to occur, however, and responsibility for correcting the situation
rests with the legal profession rather than with accountants. Two recent
cases illustrate this point. In Vela v. Yates Ford, Inc. 10 a consumer-debtor
sued a creditor for an alleged usury violation under the Texas Consumer
Credit Code. 1 The dispute in Vela concerned the number of "odd-days"
during the term of an installment contract in which the first payment was
scheduled less than one month after the initial date of the contract. 12 The
debtor counted fourteen odd-days; the creditor counted fifteen. The differ-
ence in the interest charge was $2.53. According to the court, this difference
entitled the debtor to recover twice the time-price differential of the contract
as well as reasonable attorneys' fees. 13 The court rejected the doctrine of de
minimus non curat lex on the ground that denying a recovery because a
consumer's damages, which are not an element of his cause of action, are de
minimus would be inconsistent with the Consumer Credit Code's policy of
discouraging misconduct by creditors. 14
At first glance the Vael case might be dismissed as an accounting problem.
The Texas Supreme Court, however, has made very clear during the last
tice, Presentment for Payment, Demand for Payment and Acceleration of Maturity, and Pro-
test, and agrees and consents that this note may be renewed, or at the time of payment
extended, without notice, and without releasing any of the Parties." Id. Another recent deci-
sion reached a similar result. See Real Estate Exch., Inc. v. Bacci, 676 S.W.2d 440 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ). In Bacci the clause stated:
In the event default is made in the payment of the principal of this note, or any
interest thereon as the same becomes due and payable or in whatever manner its
maturity may be brought about, then the legal holder hereof shall have the op-
tion without demand or notice to the maker or other person obligated hereon, to
declare this note immediately due and payable and may thereupon foreclose the
liens given to secure its payment.
Id. at 441.
10. 675 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, writ granted).
11. TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.01 to -15.08 (Vernon 1971 & Supp. 1984).
The Texas Consumer Credit Code is not a true code since it is not part of the official Texas
codifications, but it has acquired this name by popular usage.
12. This type of installment contract is called "irregular" under TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 5069-7.03(4) (Vernon $upp. 1984).
13. 675 S.W.2d at 238.
14. Id. at 237. The Code's penalty provisions are set forth in TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN.
art. 5069-8.01 (Vernon Supp. 1984). Under art. 5069-8.01 a creditor is liable for twice the
amount of interest or other amounts charged to a consumer in violation of subtitle 2 of the
Consumer Credit Code plus reasonable attorneys' fees.
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year that it considers the problem of unearned interest overcharges to be the
responsibility of those who draft the legal documents underlying such trans-
actions. In Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Schuenemann'5 the debtors sued on
the theory that the acceleration clauses in a note and a building contract
violated the Consumer Credit Code because the clauses provided for the
payment of unearned interest in the event of default.16 The court, over a
vigorous dissent, agreed with the debtor that the acceleration clauses pro-
vided for collection of unearned interest upon default and that the creditor
was subject to a judgment for the recovery of penalties. 17 In the course of its
discussion the court made the following comment:
[W]e fail to understand why acceleration clauses are drafted which do
not include a sentence expressly disavowing any intention to collect ex-
cessive unearned interest or finance charges in the event the obligation
is accelerated. . . . To settle the matter clearly in the contract between
the parties is a service to the creditor, the debtor, and the taxpayers of
this state.'8
Draftsmen should adopt the suggestion of the Texas Supreme Court and
include a sentence in acceleration clauses that says, in effect: "The creditor
under this contract expressly disavows any intention to contract for, charge,
collect or receive any unearned interest or finance charge if the obligation
under this contract is accelerated." Such a sentence would at least open the
door to proof of the bona fide error defense in usury cases by helping to
establish the unintentional nature of an overcharge.' 9
II. SALES TRANSACTIONS
A. Scope of Chapter 2
Lease Transactions. The Texas courts remain consistently unwilling to ex-
tend the warranty provisions of the Code to lease transactions. 20 This re-
fusal to extend the Code provisions by analogy was reaffirmed in U.S.
Armament Corp. v. Charlie Thomas Leasing Co. 2 1 The court based its deci-
sion solely on the lack of binding Texas authority holding that the Code
warranty provisions should be applied to lease transactions. 22 The court did
not discuss the policies underlying the pros and cons of extension by
analogy.
15. 668 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. 1984).
16. The plaintiff alleged violations of TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069--6.02(9)(a),
-8.01, -8.02 (Vernon 1971 & Supp. 1984).
17. 668 S.W.2d at 332-33.
18. Id. at 333 n.6.
19. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-8.01(0 (Vernon Supp. 1984), provides that no
liability will attach to persons who violate the article if such person can show by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the violation was unintentional and the result of a bona fide error.
20. See Hobbs Trailers v. J.T. Arnett Grain Co., 560 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. 1978) (transaction
was lease, not sale of trailers; parol evidence rule applied); OJ & C Co. v. General Hosp.
Leasing, Inc., 578 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ) (contract
was for lease, not sale of computers; not within art. 2).
21. 661 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
22. Id. at 200.
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Materialmen's Liens. In Buck v. Acme Brick Co. 23 the court did apply the
Code's four-year statute of limitations to the enforcement of a materialman's
lien held by a subcontractor. 24 A dissenting opinion argued that no sale was
made to the owners of the property, but only to the general contractor. 25
Under such circumstances, the dissent reasoned, the two-year statute of limi-
tations on actions for debt 26 should be applied and the action, therefore,
should be barred. 27 The development of a consistent legal theory to explain
why only some portions of the Code can be extended by analogy would be
desirable.
B. Enforceability of Sales Contracts
Statute of Frauds: Confirmations Between Merchants. Under section 2.201
of the Code a writing sent in confirmation of a contract may bind a merchant
unless written notice of objection to its contents is given within ten days after
receipt of the writing.28 The Commercial Transactions article in last year's
issue indicated that a confirmatory writing must clearly be a confirmation
and not an offer or counteroffer. 29 The case giving rise to that discussion
was Great Western Sugar Co. v. Lone Star Donut Co. 30 In Great Western
Sugar Co. one party sent a letter stating: "This letter is a written confirma-
tion of our agreement. Please sign and return to me the enclosed counter-
part of this letter signalling your acceptance of the above agreement."' 3' The
court held that the request that the recipient reply converted the letter from
a mere confirmation into an offer.32 The failure of the buyer to object, there-
fore, did not amount to an acceptance or make the contract enforceable
under the Code's statute of frauds.33 The Fifth Circuit has upheld this sum-
mary judgment decision of the trial court,34 thereby resulting in an authori-
tative Fifth Circuit interpretation of section 2.201.
Contracts Created by Course of Conduct. A contract may be formed under
chapter 2 in any manner sufficient to show agreement between the parties,
including conduct by both parties that recognizes the existence of a con-
tract.35 A contract created by conduct of the parties was known at common
23. 666 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1984, no writ).
24. Id. at 277; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.725 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
Under § 2.725 an action for breach of a contract for sale is barred after four years. Id.
25. 666 S.W.2d at 277-79 (Brookshire, J., dissenting).
26. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5526(4) (Vernon 1958), amended by Act of June 13,
1979, ch. 716, § 1, 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws 1768-69, provided for a two-year statute of limitations
when the cause of action arose in this case.
27. 666 S.W.2d at 278 (Brookshire, J., dissenting).
28. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.201(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
29. See Krahmer, Commercial Transactions, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 38 Sw. L.J.
207, 210-11 (1984) [hereinafter cited as 1984 Survey].
30. 567 F. Supp. 340 (N.D. Tex.), affd per curiam, 721 F.2d 510 (5th Cir. 1983).
31. 567 F. Supp. at 342.
32. Id. at 344.
33. Id. The UCC's statute of frauds is found at TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.201
(Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
34. Great W. Sugar Co. v. Lone Star Donut Co., 721 F.2d 510 (5th Cir. 1983).
35. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.204(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
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law as a contract implied in fact.36 The substance of such contracts may
include not only the underlying sales transaction, but also associated periph-
eral matters such as interest or late charges stated on an invoice that the
buyer has paid without objection. 37 These additional terms can become part
of the contract and be fully enforceable against the buyer even without ex-
press agreement. 38
In Industrial Disposal Supply Co. v. Perryman Brothers Trash Service,
Inc. 39 the sale of goods on open account was accompanied by an invoice
stating that a late charge of one and one-half percent per month would be
added after thirty days. The buyer argued that the parties had never agreed
to a specific rate of interest and that the interest charge should, therefore, be
at the general rate of six percent per annum.4° The court held, however, that
the dealings of the parties over an eight-to-ten-year time period without ob-
jection by the buyer to the late charge provision and the buyer's payment of
the stated late charge on two occasions clearly established that the parties
had reached an implied agreement for payment of the specified interest rate
of one and one-half percent per month.41 The court noted, however, that no
agreement should be implied merely because a buyer fails to object to an
interest or late charge provision when the buyer has not actually paid the
charge in past dealings with the seller. 42
Modification of Contracts by Conduct. In addition to the formation of a con-
tract by course of conduct, the Code permits the modification of a contract
in the same manner.43 In Southwest Industrial Import & Export, Inc. v. Bor-
neo Sumatra Trading Co.44 a buyer knowingly accepted and paid for three
shipments of wire at a price greater than that specified in the original con-
tract. In the buyer's action to recover the alleged overpayments, the court
held that the buyer had impliedly agreed to the price increase and that the
course of conduct of the parties had effectively modified the contract.45 A
summary judgment in favor of the seller was affirmed.46
Unconscionability as a Claim. In the last Survey the author noted North Star
Dodge Sales, Inc. v. Luna47 as illustrative of the difference in the treatment
of unconscionability as an affirmative defense under the Code and as the
basis for a cause of action under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act
36. 1 A. SQUILLANTE & J. FONSECA, WILLISTON ON SALES 199 (4th ed. 1973).
37. See Preston Farm & Ranch Supply, Inc. v. Bio-Zyme Enters., 625 S.W.2d 295, 299-
300 (Tex. 1981).
38. Id. at 300.
39. 664 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
40. The six percent figure is that specified by TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.03
(Vernon Supp. 1984).
41. 664 S.W.2d at 766.
42. Id.
43. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.208 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
44. 666 S.W.2d 625 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ refd n.r.e.).
45. Id. at 629.
46. Id.
47. 653 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983), rev'd, 667 S.W.2d 115 (Tex. 1984).
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(TDTPA).48 In North Star Dodge the buyer recovered damages for the
seller's unconscionable failure to comply with an express warranty to repair
various defects in a vehicle purchased from the seller or to refund the
purchase price.49 Although the buyer prevailed on the unconscionability
claim, the court of appeals denied the recovery of damages for mental
anguish despite a jury finding that the seller had knowingly committed the
unconscionable acts. 50 During this survey period the Texas Supreme Court
reversed the action of the court of appeals and held that damages for mental
anguish are recoverable when the defendant has knowingly followed a
course of unconscionable action. 51 The supreme court also held that the
court of appeals erred in denying recovery for loss of use when evidence of
the reasonable rental value of a substitute vehicle was presented, even
though the plaintiff had not actually incurred out-of-pocket expenses by
renting another car.52 The court of appeals was affirmed on the allowance of
other damages to the plaintiff.5 3 In light of the subsequent history of Luna
during this survey period, the case remains very significant because of its
approval of mental anguish as a recoverable element of damage in uncon-
scionability cases and its liberalization of proof for loss of use. The entire
sequence of opinions merits careful study.
C. Warranties
Warranties of Title. Another case noted in the last Survey54 was also re-
viewed by the Texas Supreme Court during this survey period. In Big H
Auto Auction, Inc. v. Saenz Motors55 the supreme court affirmed the ruling of
the lower court that the purchase of an automobile for resale is a "use"
under the TDTPA56 and that the purchaser was entitled to recover under
the Act for breach of the warranty of good title.5 7 Recovery under the
TDTPA for breach of the good title warranty was also permitted in Horta v.
48. See 1984 Survey, supra note 29, at 211-12. The Code treats unconscionability as an
affirmative defense in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.302 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). The
TDTPA, TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1984), treats unconscio-
nability as the basis for a cause of action in § 17.50(a)(3).
49. 653 S.W.2d at 901.
50. Id. at 898. The court stated that a finding that the unconscionable acts had been
committed knowingly for purposes of the TDTPA would not support an award of damages for
mental anguish, because knowingly within the TDTPA was not equivalent to the tort concept
of willful or malicious, which is required for a recovery for mental anguish. Id. at 897.
51. Luna v. North Star Dodge Sales, Inc., 667 S.W.2d 115, 118 (Tex. 1984).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 120. On remand the court of appeals considered the issues of evidentiary sup-
port for mental anguish and loss of use damages and whether the damages awarded by the jury
for these items were excessive. North Star Dodge Sales, Inc. v. Luna, 672 S.W.2d 304, 307
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, on remand). The court upheld both damage awards. Id.
54. Saenz Motors v. Big H Auto Auction, Inc., 653 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1983), aftd, 665 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. 1984); see 1984 Survey, supra note 29, at 213.
55. 665 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. 1984).
56. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(1) (Vernon Supp. 1984). For the court's
discussion of the meaning of "use" for purposes of the TDTPA, see 665 S.W.2d at 758-59.
57. 665 S.W.2d at 759. Unless disclaimed, the warranty of title exists by operation of law




Tennison58 without reference to the decision in Big H Auto Auction, proba-
bly because of the unavailability of the Big H opinion when Horta was
decided.
In two other warranty of title cases the sellers were also found to have
breached their warranties of good title, but the cases went beyond the ordi-
nary warranty litigation.59 In both cases the sellers argued that subjecting
them to liability for vehicles that turned out to be stolen was unconstitu-
tional because the sellers had relied on the Texas Certificate of Title Act 6° in
purchasing the cars. The sellers contended that Texas was the culpable
party rather than the sellers because of state error in issuing incorrect title
certificates. The courts in both cases rejected the constitutional claims, and
both courts noted that any negligent or improper action by an agent of the
state would be a proper basis for a claim against the agents' bonds under
section 56 of the Texas Certificate of Title Act.61
Express Warranties in the Sale of Livestock. While the Texas version of the
Code includes a nonuniform amendment excluding implied warranties in the
sale of livestock, 62 the parties to a contract for the sale of livestock are still
free to create express warranties as they may desire. In Villalon v. Vollmer-
ing63 the seller of a bull warranted the animal to be a breeder. The animal
turned out to be a nonbreeder, and the buyer sued for replacement or refund
as specified in the contract. For reasons not apparent in the opinion, the
buyer lost in the trial court, but the appellate court held that sufficient evi-
dence substantiated the buyer's claim that the bull was a nonbreeder and
that the seller had the burden of going forward with evidence to prove that
the bull was a breeder. 64 The seller was unable to meet this burden, so the
court rendered judgment for the buyer.65 In its opinion the court specifically
noted that the buyer in a breach of warranty suit is not required to show any
particular reliance on the seller's affirmation about the quality of the goods
being sold.66 This statement by the court helps to correct an erroneous as-
sertion in an earlier decision that a buyer is required to prove reliance to
58. 671 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ) (buyer allowed treble
damages under TDTPA because claim for breach of warranty of title to car arose before
amendments to that Act).
59. See Keller v. Judd, 671 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ); Doyle v.
Harben, 660 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ).
60. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6687-1 (Vernon 1977 & Supp. 1984). The Certificate
of Title Act provides for the issuance of certificates of title for motor vehicles and the recorda-
tion of liens on the certificates and gives conditions for transfer and replacement of certificates.
Id.
61. Keller v. Judd, 671 S.W.2d 604, 607 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ); Doyle
v. Harben, 660 S.W.2d 586, 589 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ). TEX. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 6687-1, § 56 (Vernon 1977) provides that any designated agent of the state
who fails to comply with the provisions of the Certificate of Title Act shall be liable on his
official bond for any damages suffered.
62. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.316(0 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
63. 676 S.W.2d 220 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ).
64. Id. at 223. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.303 (Vernon 1968) provides for this
allocation of the burdens of proof.
65. 676 S.W.2d at 223.
66. Id. at 222 n.l.
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recover damages in a warranty action. 67
Disclaimer of Warranties. The Code not only permits the free creation of
express warranties, 68 but also permits the disclaimer of warranties and the
limitation of remedies for breach when the Code standards for visual con-
spicuousness and verbal clarity have been met. 69 Whether a disclaimer or
limitation of remedy is "conspicuous" is for judicial decision,70 and a motion
for summary judgment may properly be used to raise this issue. 71 In Ellmer
v. Delaware Mini-Computer Systems, Inc.72 the court held that a disclaimer
of warranty and a limitation of remedy were sufficiently conspicuous to pre-
clude an action for breach under the Code.73 This portion of the decision is
established law.74 Of greater interest is the court's ruling that the disclaimer
and limitation effectively barred the buyer's recovery on a deceptive trade
practices claim for breach of warranty.75 In support of this branch of its
opinion the court cited the Texas Supreme Court's decision in G- W-L, Inc. v.
Robichaux,76 in which a disclaimer of warranty in the sale of a dwelling was
held effective to bar recovery on a deceptive trade practices claim.77 The
Ellmer court further held that section 17.42 of the TDTPA,78 which pre-
vents the waiver of rights under the Act, does not prevent the disclaimer of
warranties or the limitation of remedies for breach.79
D. Bona Fide Purchase
Entrustment of Possession. Section 2.403 of the Code covers a number of
situations in which the owner of goods may create such apparent power in
another to sell the goods that an innocent purchaser receives good title even
67. See General Supply & Equip. Co., v. Phillips, 490 S.W.2d 913, 917 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Tyler 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
68. Express warranties are created under the terms of TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 2.313 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
69. Id. § 2.316.
70. Id. § 1.201(10).
71. Ellmer v. Delaware Mini-Computer Sys., Inc., 665 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1983, no writ).
72. 665 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ).
73. Id. at 160.
74. See W.R. Weaver Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 580 S.W.2d 76, 81 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
75. 665 S.W.2d at 161. The buyer brought the claim under TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 17.42 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
76. 643 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. 1982).
77. Id. at 393. Robichaux was discussed and criticized in last year's Survey for its holding
that a disclaimer that did not meet Code standards was nonetheless effective to disclaim an
implied warranty of habitability. See 1974 Survey, supra note 29, at 215-16.
78. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.42 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
79. 665 S.W.2d at 160. On this point, one might argue that disclaimers are distinct from
limitations of remedy and that remedy limitations cannot be waived by reason of the provi-
sions of TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.42 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1984), while
disclaimers, which go to the existence of a warranty rather than to the remedies available for a
warranty breach, can be waived. This point was not discussed and, to the best of the author's




against the claim of the true owner.80 One such situation is the entrustment
of goods to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind. In this case the
Code protects the expectations of an unwary purchaser who buys from the
merchant by creating a power in the merchant to transfer all rights of the
entruster to a bona fide purchaser.8 1  Such a power is created only upon
occurrence of an actual entrustment and only when the merchant deals in
goods of that kind. When these circumstances do not exist, the purchaser is




The Perfect Tender Rule in the Sale of Goods. In an earlier Survey article,83
this author criticized the court in Del Monte Corp. v. Martin4 for applying
the general contract rule of substantial performance 5 instead of the special-
ized rule developed in sales cases that requires the seller to tender goods that
conform to the contract in all respects.8 6 This rule of sales law, known as
the "perfect tender rule," has been carried into the Code in section 2.601.87
Although the term "perfect tender" should not be taken literally, the re-
quirements that the rule places on the seller and the allocation of burdens of
performance and proof differ from those of the substantial performance
rule.88 Proper application of the Code, therefore, requires that sales cases
involving a single delivery of goods be treated differently from general con-
tract cases. Since the erroneous decision in Del Monte, the Texas courts
have recognized the applicability of the perfect tender rule in sales cases and
have disclaimed Del Monte as incorrect.8 9
Anticipatory Repudiation. One of the most interesting and difficult areas in
80. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.403 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
81. Id. § 2.403(b).
82. Olin Corp. v. Cargo Carriers, Inc., 673 S.W.2d 211, 216-17 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1984, no writ) (bona fide purchasers of fertilizer liable to owner because the ware-
houser-seller had no title, the owner had not entrusted the fertilizer to the warehouser, and the
warehouser was not a merchant in kind).
83. Krahmer, Commercial Transactions, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 34 Sw. L.J. 199,
208 (1980).
84. 574 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, no writ).
85. Under the doctrine of substantial performance, if one party is found to have substan-
tially performed a contract, the other party may not cancel the contract and may become liable
for breach if he withholds his own performance, but may sue the substantially performing
party for partial breach. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 11-22
(1977).
86. The rule governing sales transactions appears in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 2.601 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
87. Id. The Code distinguishes between single delivery contracts in which a perfect tender
is required by § 2.601 and installment contracts in which a substantial impairment of the
whole contract must be found to constitute a breach of the whole contract. See id. § 2.612.
88. Among the differences are the buyer's power to reject goods, id. § 2.602, and the
seller's power to attempt a cure of defective tender, id. § 2.508.
89. See Printing Center of Texas, Inc. v. Supermind Publishing Co., 669 S.W.2d 779, 784
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ); Texas Imports v. Allday, 649 S.W.2d 730,
737-38 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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the law of sales involves anticipatory repudiation by a seller or buyer.
Problems occur at two primary levels, each with its own set of subsidiary
issues. These issues involve proof of the repudiation and the appropriate
course of future action.
At the first level, the aggrieved party must determine whether a repudia-
tion has actually occurred. In some instances the determination amounts to
a simple matter, as when the other party has given unequivocal notice that
he will not perform. In other instances the determination is difficult or im-
possible to make, as when the other party sends a communication that am-
biguously discusses difficulties of performance or price increases, but never
clearly indicates an unwillingness to perform. 90 When doubt exists about a
party's intention to perform, the Code provides a way to pin down the mat-
ter by permitting the other party to demand assurance of performance. 9'
The Code specifies the type of assurance required and the time by which the
assurance must be given. 92 A failure to give the assurance of due perform-
ance constitutes a repudiation under the Code.93 By using a demand for
assurance of performance, the aggrieved party can avoid the problems of an
ambiguous communication.
At the second level, once a repudiation has occurred the aggrieved party is
faced with choosing a course of future action. Section 2.610 of the Code
permits the aggrieved party to await performance by the repudiating party
for a commercially reasonable time, or to immediately resort to any remedy
for breach. 94 In either case the aggrieved party may suspend his own per-
formance under the contract. 95 The buyer's remedies for breach include, but
are not limited to, the purchase of covering goods 96 or an action for damages
based on the difference between the contract and the market price.97 If a
buyer chooses to sue for damages rather than cover, a difficult legal issue is
presented. One author has termed this issue as "perhaps the most grizzly
interpretative problem in Article 2: when does one measure the market?"98
The problem arises because section 2.713 of the Code provides that "the
measure of damages for nondelivery or repudiation by the seller is the differ-
ence between the market price at the time when the buyer learned of the
breach and the contract price." 99 The phrase "learned of the breach" can be
90. See, e.g., Reliance Cooperage Corp. v. Treat, 195 F.2d 977, 979 (8th Cir. 1952); Puget
Sound Marina, Inc. v. Jorgensen, 3 Wash. App. 476, 475 P.2d 919, 921 (1970).
91. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.609 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
92. Id.
93. Id.; see International Therapeutics, Inc. v. McGraw-Edison Co., 721 F.2d 488 (5th
Cir. 1983), which was decided during the survey period and involved the use of an assurance of
due performance. In McGraw-Edison failure to provide a financial statement was held to be
evidence of a repudiation. Id. at 492.
94. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.610 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
95. Id.
96. Id. §§ 2.711, .712.
97. Id. § 2.713.
98. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK FO THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COM-
MP"RCIAL CODE 242 (2d ed. 1980).
- 9. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.713 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). The market price
is a.;termined as of the place for tender. Id.
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interpreted three ways in the context of an anticipatory repudiation:
(1) when the buyer learns of the repudiation; (2) at a commercially reason-
able time following the date when the buyer learns of the repudiation; or
(3) when performance is due under the contract. o The Texas courts have
not yet ruled on the question of when a buyer's damages should be measured
in an anticipatory repudiation context. A recent federal decision, however,
has addressed this issue. In Cosden Oil & Chemical Co. v. Karl 0. Helm
Aktiengesellschaft'0° the court recognized the novelty of the issue under
Texas law. 10 2 With no controlling state decision available, the court meticu-
lously explored the ramifications of the various interpretations of "the time
when the buyer learned of the breach" in section 2.713.103 One quotation
from the opinion seems to reflect accurately the reasoning of the court:
In light of the Code's persistent theme of commercial reasonableness,
the prominence of cover as a remedy, and the time given an aggrieved
buyer to await performance and to investigate cover before selecting his
remedy, we agree with the district court that 'learned of the breach'
incorporates section 2.610's commercially reasonable time. 104
The court, therefore, chose the second alternative noted above, and "learned
of the breach" was interpreted to mean the date of repudiation plus a com-
mercially reasonable time. As a carefully reasoned decision on a difficult
issue, Cosden Oil should be a persuasive interpretation for the Texas courts
on the question of damages in anticipatory repudiation cases.
F. Remedies
Reclamation of Goods from an Insolvent Buyer. The right of a seller to re-
claim goods from an insolvent buyer has a notorious history. 10 5 Much of the
litigation has involved a conflict between the seller's reclamation right pro-
vided in section 2.702106 and the rights of a secured creditor under a chapter
9 security interest. 10 7 In United States v. Westside Bank'08 the Fifth Circuit
faced the issue of whether the right of reclamation of an unpaid credit seller
extends to the proceeds of goods sold to an insolvent buyer when the com-
peting creditor is not a secured party, but another general unsecured creditor
of the same buyer. In Westside the primary creditor of an insolvent buyer
had foreclosed and sold the buyer's assets and paid in full all secured parties.
The seller asserted a priority right to a share of the remaining proceeds on
the theory that the right of reclamation was superior to the claims of un-
secured general creditors. The court agreed that the seller's right to reclaim
had priority over the claims of general creditors because to hold otherwise
100. Further discussion of these three interpretations appears in J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS,
supra note 98, § 6-7.
101. 736 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1984).
102. Id. at 1069-70.
103. Id.; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.713 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
104. 736 F.2d at 1073.
105. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 98, § 24-9, and cases cited therein.
106. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.702 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
107. Id. §§ 9.101-.319 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
108. 732 F.2d 1258 (5th Cir. 1984).
19851
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
would in effect emasculate the reclamation remedy.109 Although Westside
arose in a nonbankruptcy setting, the court theorized that the same result
would obtain in bankruptcy. 110 Like the anticipatory repudiation issue in
Cosden Oil, 1  a seller's right to reclaim proceeds as against general creditors
had not been decided previously under Texas law, and the court was re-
quired to act on the basis of its own interpretation of the Code.1 12 Westside
is another valuable source for Texas courts faced with the seller's right to
reclaim.
Seller's Remedies for Breach. One of the seller's remedies provided by the
Code for a buyer's breach of contract is resale of the affected goods.1 13 If the
resale is conducted in a commercially reasonable manner, the seller is enti-
tled to recover the difference between the resale price and the contract price
from the defaulting buyer.1 14 In Serna, Inc. v. Harman1 15 some goods had
been resold properly, but the remainder had not. The court held that the
seller is entitled to damages based on the resale price for those goods prop-
erly resold and may still be entitled to damages based on the difference be-
tween the contract price and the market price for those goods not sold in a
commercially reasonable manner.1 16 The Code rejects any doctrine of the
election of remedies, the court noted, and whether the pursuit of one remedy
bars another remedy depends on the facts of the individual case.1 17 The
court remanded the case to determine if the election of resale should operate
as a bar to any other damage recovery on the facts of the case, presumably
on the grounds of a waiver or estoppel.1 18
III. COMMERCIAL PAPER
A. Form of Negotiable Instruments
Interpretation of Prepayment Clause. Chapter 3 of the Code, which covers
commercial paper, is replete with descriptions of the proper form for negoti-
able instruments.'1 19 Despite this detail, questions still arise requiring resort
to judicial interpretation on points that the statute does not cover. 120 Karam
v. Ballou12 1 is a recent example. In Karam several notes provided for pay-
ment of 180 equal monthly installments, with the first installment due on or
before January 1, 1980, and subsequent installments due on or before the
109. Id. at 1263.
110. Id. at 1264.
111. See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text for a discussion of Cosden Oil.
112. 732 F.2d at 1263.
113. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.706 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
114. Id.
115. 742 F.2d 186 (5th Cir. 1984).
116. Id. at 190.
117. Id. at 191.
118. Id.
119. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.104-.118 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
120. For example, despite the frequent use of the terms "maker" and "payee" in the Code,
these words are not defined, and resort to pre-Code or non-Code law is required to determine
their meaning.
121. 673 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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same day of each succeeding month until the notes were paid. The court
considered whether the phrase "on or before" allowed. prepayments on the
notes to be made without penalty. Basing its decision on the pre-Code case
of Lovenberg v. Henry,1 22 the court held that the notes granted an unlimited
right to prepay any or all installments without penalty. 123 Karam estab-
lished a clear rule for the proper form of negotiable instruments on the issue
of prepayment rights. 12
4
Payment from a Particular Source. A provision in an instrument stating that
payment is to be made only from a particular fund or source is normally
treated as a conditional promise rendering the instrument nonnegotiable.12 5
Instruments issued by a governmental agency, however, may be limited to
payment from particular funds or sources, and section 3.105 expressly pro-
vides that the limitation does not render such governmental paper condi-
tional. 126 In Memorial Point Municipal Utility District v. United Savings
Association127 the court apparently overlooked this provision of section
3.105 or the parties never cited the section. A decision that the note was not
made conditional by a reference to payment from a particular fund was
grounded on general contract law concerning conditions and covenants 128
and upon a special utility district statute 129 that was only slightly relevant to
the issue. 130 The court's failure to raise section 3.105 is unfortunate because
the section directly addresses the point.
B. Enforcement of Commercial Paper
Holding a Certificate of Deposit "In Due Course." A party becomes a holder
in due course of a negotiable instrument by taking it for value, in good faith,
122. 104 Tex. 550, 140 S.W. 1079 (1911).
123. 673 S.W.2d at 645.
124. Karam also provided an interesting example of the judicial process. At one point in
its opinion the court stated:
The trial court concluded that the prepayment provision of the Cass notes is
unambiguous and that the "on or before" provision of the notes presents only a
limited right to prepay the following month's installment due under the notes.
We agree that the provision is unambiguous, but conclude that the notes grant a
full right to prepay any installment due at any time.
Id. at 644-45. One wonders how unambiguous a note might be when two courts ascribe two
opposite meanings to the same language. This quotation could be used as a cogent criticism by
example of the "plain meaning rule" in general contract law. Cf Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v.
G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 69 Cal. 2d 33, 35-38, 442 P.2d 641, 643-46, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 561, 563-66 (1968) (court interprets contract according to judge's linguistic background;
exclusion of extrinsic evidence reflects "primitive faith" in possibility of perfect verbal
expression).
125. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.104(a)(2), .105(b)(2) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
1968).
126. Id. § 3.105(a)(7).
127. 666 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, no writ).
128. The general contract law on conditions and covenants was drawn from the classic
contracts case of Hohenberg Bros. v. George E. Gibbons & Co., 537 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1976)
(clause describing delivery of instruments to broker not a condition precedent for his liability
for breach of contract to deliver cotton).
129. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 54.303(a) (Vernon 1972).
130. 666 S.W.2d at 204.
19851
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
and without notice of defenses to or claims against the instrument. 1 3 Once
a holder in due course qualifies as such, the holder may retain the instrument
"free from . . .all claims to it on the part of any person."' 32 The Dallas
court of appeals applied these rules in Dallas/Fort Worth Airport Bank v.
Dallas Bank & Trust Co. 133 to protect the holder in due course of a certifi-
cate of deposit against a claimed right of set-off asserted by the bank that
had issued the certificate of deposit. 13 4 The issuing bank contended that it
had a perfected security interest in all deposit accounts of the debtor and
that this security interest had priority over the claim of a holder in due
course to the funds allocable to the certificate of deposit. The court properly
held that section 9.105 of the Code1 35 specifically excludes accounts evi-
denced by certificates of deposit from the definition of "deposit accounts"
and, because of this exclusion, the asserted security interest did not attach to
the account in question. 136 The court also noted that a certificate of deposit
amounts to a promissory note running from the issuing bank to the holder,
and a set-off against the funds would lack mutuality because the holder was
not indebted to the bank. 137 Once the holder became a holder in due course,
it was entitled, as a matter of law, to enforce the certificate of deposit free of
all claims of the issuing bank.1 38 The lesson of this case is clear: when a
negotiable certificate of deposit has been issued, no loan should be made on
the security of the funds underlying the certificate unless the lender obtains
physical possession of the certificate itself. 139
Federal Trade Commission Holder in Due Course Rule. In an interesting
pair of cases, 4° the Corpus Christi court of appeals considered the effect of
the Federal Trade Commission's holder in due course rule 14 1 and its rela-
131. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.302(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
132. Id. § 3.305(a).
133. 667 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
134. Id. at 575-76.
135. TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 9.105(a)(5) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
136. 667 S.W.2d at 574-75.
137. Id. at 575.
138. Id. at 575-76.
139. This point is consistent with TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.304(a) (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon Supp. 1984), which, subject to limited exceptions, requires physical possession of an
instrument to perfect a security interest in that instrument. The court noted that the holder in
due course had met this requirement. 667 S.W.2d at 575; see also TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 9.309 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1984) (discussing rights of holder in due course to
take instrument free of conflicting and perfected security interest).
140. Flores v. Charles Thomas Courtesy Ford, Inc., 669 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1984, no writ); De La Fuente v. Home Say. Ass'n, 669 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1984, no writ).
141. The Federal Trade Commission's holder in due course rule was adopted by regulation
under the official title of "Preservation of Consumer Claims and Defenses." See 16 C.F.R.
§ 433.2 (1984). The rule has been effective since 1976 and requires that any consumer credit
contract or note contain the following legend in at least ten-point bold type: "Any holder of
this consumer credit contract is subject to all claims and defenses which the debtor could




tionship to the Texas Consumer Credit Code. 142 In both cases the required
FTC notice appeared on consumer credit contracts. In one case, Flores v.
Charles Thomas Courtesy Ford, Inc.,143 the contract also contained a clause
stating in effect that the debtor would assert no claims or defenses against
the assignee that the debtor might have against the secured party except
those granted in the security agreement. The debtor argued that a contract
in this form violated section 7.07(6) of the Consumer Credit Code 144 as a
matter of law. Based on its decision in an earlier case, 145 the court held that
no violation had occurred.146
In the other case, De La Fuente v. Home Savings Association,147 the con-
tract created a first lien on the debtor's home, certificates of completion had
been signed before the work was finished, the contract was negotiated on the
same day that it was signed, and the assignee had never given notice of nego-
tiation, all in violation of various provisions of the Consumer Credit
Code. 148 The holder contended that it was not liable for any of the viola-
tions because it qualified as a holder in due course of the contract docu-
ments, including a negotiable note signed as part of the transaction. The
court held that the purpose of the FTC rule was to have a holder of paper
bear losses caused by actions of the seller; the benefits of the Texas holder in
due course doctrine were, therefore, not available when a consumer credit
contract contained the notice required by the FTC.149
C. Defenses to Enforcement of Commercial Paper
The Holder in Due Course and Defenses to Payment. A primary advantage
of qualifying as a holder in due course is the ability to enforce an instrument
despite the existence of certain defenses on the part of the drawer or
maker.150 Among the defenses that are cut off by a holder in due course are
those of misrepresentation and failure of consideration.' 5 ' A presumption
that the holder is entitled to recover upon the mere production of the instru-
ment unless the defendant establishes a defense further aids the holder. 52 In
142. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-6.05, -6.06, -7.07, -8.01, -13.03
(Vernon Supp. 1984).
143. 669 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ).
144. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-7.07(6) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
145. Haley v. Pagan Lewis Motors, Inc., 647 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
146. 669 S.W.2d at 166-67.
147. 669 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ).
148. The various sections that had been violated were TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts.
5069-6.05 (prohibiting first liens on dwellings in consumer installment contracts), -6.06(3)
(requiring certificates of completion after work is finished), -13.03(b) (prohibiting negotiation
of a consumer credit home solicitation sales contract until at least three days after signing), -
8.01 (requiring notice of negotiation of the contract to be given by the assignee) (Vernon Supp.
1984).
149. 669 S.W.2d at 142.
150. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.305(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968), for a list of
defenses not cut off by a holder in due course.
151. Id.
152. Id. § 3.307(b).
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Jonwilco, Inc. v. C1 T Financial Services' 53 the court applied both of these
principles in holding a defendant liable on an instrument despite allegations
of fraud and failure of consideration because the Code presumed the holder
to be a holder in due course absent some evidence to the contrary.' 54 The
court may have gone too far in reaching this decision, however, because
Jonwilco was decided on a motion for summary judgment and not after a
trial on the merits. Section 3.307 requires only that the defendant establish a
defense to make the holder prove his holder in due course status, but does
not require direct evidence tending to disprove such status at the summary
judgment stage. 55 Jonwilco required a direct challenge to holder in due
course status on a motion for summary judgment, and this requirement may
be beyond existing Texas law.
Despite the ability of a holder in due course to cut off many defenses,
some defenses supported by important public policy grounds remain effec-
tive even against favored holder in due course status. 156 In Robinson v.
Rudy 157 the defendant alleged that a note was usurious, and the court recog-
nized that this defense would be good even against a holder in due course.
The court found, however, that the note in question was not usurious and
allowed the holder to recover.' 58
Impairment of Collateral as a Defense to Payment. Section 3.606 of the Code
discharges a party from liability on an instrument whenever the holder un-
justifiably impairs any collateral given as security for the instrument. 59 In
Lowry v. Crimmins'6° the court decided that the language of section 3.606
discharging any party to the instrument included the maker of a note. ' 6' The
court expressly rejected contrary decisions in two earlier cases. ' 62 The Texas
Supreme Court has granted the plaintiff a writ of error; the decision in this
case will clarify Texas law on the proper interpretation of section 3.606.
153. 662 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, no writ).
154. Id. at 666.
155. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.307(b), (c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) provides:
(b) When signatures are admitted or established, production of the instru-
ment entitles a holder to recover on it unless the defendant establishes a defense.
(c) After it is shown that a defense exists a person claiming the rights of a
holder in due course has the burden of establishing that he or some person under
whom he claims is in all respects a holder in due course.
156. These defenses are listed in TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.305(b) (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon 1968). They include such matters as infancy, illegality, and incompetence. Id.
157. 666 S.W.2d 507, 509 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ).
158. Id. at 510.
159. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.606(a)(2) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
160. 665 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1984, writ granted).
161. Id. at 233.
162. Pan Am. Bank v. Nowland, 650 S.W.2d 879, 887 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (shareholder-signer of voting trust agreement was in position of maker of note
executed by trustee and therefore not discharged from liability by § 3.606); Hooper v. Ryan,






Forged Indorsements and the Liability of Banks for Conversion. Litigation
for conversion of an instrument can occur at two distinct levels in the bank-
ing system. A simple example will illustrate these levels. If a check is stolen
from a named payee and transferred under a forged indorsement to a collect-
ing bank that obtains payment on the instrument from the payor bank, both
the collecting bank and the payor bank are guilty of conversion, and both are
potentially liable to the true owner for the amount of the check.' 63 As be-
tween themselves, the collecting bank is also potentially liable to the payor
bank for breach of the warranty of good title that is created by operation of
law when payment is obtained on an instrument. 64 In this fact situation,
the true owner may choose between suing at the collecting bank level or,
alternatively, bringing a direct action against the payor bank.' 65 This fact
situation might be varied to include more banks because of a longer bank
collection chain or only a single bank if the thief happened to deal directly
with the payor bank.
In two cases decided during the survey period, payees successfully main-
tained actions against payor banks for conversion. Attempts by the payor
banks to show that the wrongdoer had been cloaked with apparent authority
to negotiate instruments on behalf of the payees were rejected in both
cases.' 66 In one case the instrument had not been indorsed at all, and the
court properly recognized that payment to the wrong party on a missing
indorsement is as much a conversion as payment on a forged
indorsement. 167
In another conversion case, Steven-Daniels Corp. v. Commercial National
Bank,' 68 the payee chose to sue the collecting bank instead of the payor
bank. Section 3.419 of the Code provides that a collecting bank that has
acted in good faith and in accordance with reasonable commercial standards
"is not liable in conversion or otherwise to the true owner beyond the
amount of any proceeds remaining in his hands.'169 The court interpreted
this provision to relieve the collecting bank of liability based on jury findings
that the bank had acted in good faith and in accordance with reasonable
commercial standards. 170 This interpretation is significant because it is the
first state court decision in Texas involving this provision of the Code. The
163. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.419 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
164. See id. §§ 3.417, 4.207.
165. Id. § 3.419.
166. Ames v. Great S. Bank, 672 S.W.2d 447, 450 (Tex. 1984); Continental State Bank v.
Miles Gen. Contractors, 661 S.W.2d 770, 774 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, no writ).
167. Ames v. Great S. Bank, 672 S.W.2d 447, 450 (Tex. 1984).
168. 673 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
169. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.419(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). Section 3.419
also defines conversion of an instrument and states that the measure of the drawee's liability is
the face amount of the instrument and that a payor bank is not liable in conversion solely
because it fails to pay proceeds of an item consistently with the restrictive indorsement of one
other than the item's immediate transferor. Id.
170. 673 S.W.2d at 653.
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court distinguished an earlier, contrary interpretation of the same provision
that the Fifth Circuit had rendered. 17'
As noted in the hypothetical above, in a conversion situation a collecting
bank may be liable to a payor bank for breach of warranty of good title. 172
In Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. First City Bank 173 the subrogee of the payor
bank sued the collecting bank for reimbursement on eighteen checks bearing
forged indorsements. The collecting bank successfully defended against the
action by demonstrating the checks fell within the "fictitious payee rule" of
section 3.405 of the Code.17 4 An employee of the drawer used the names of
fictitious payees on request forms to cause the drawer to issue checks. The
employee then intercepted the checks, forged the payees' indorsements, and
cashed the checks at a collecting bank, all according to his original intent.
Under the ordinary rules of forged indorsements, the collecting bank would
have been liable for a breach of the warranty of good title. 175 Because of the
fictitious payee rule, however, the indorsements by the employee were effec-
tive to pass good title to the checks.176
A rather unusual conversion claim arose in the case of Behring Interna-
tional Inc. v. Greater Houston Bank 177 In Behring a drawer issued a check
to Norwegian American Lines that somehow ended up, without indorsement
and without authorization, in the hands of another company, Nordship
Agencies, Inc. Nordship deposited the check, without indorsing it, in its
own account at a collecting bank. The check was initially paid, but when
Behring's comptroller noticed the lack of indorsement, the account entries
on the check were reversed, and Behring returned the check to the collecting
bank. In the meantime Nordship had gone into bankruptcy. To prevent loss
to itself, the collecting bank set-off the amount of the check against some
bank accounts that Behring maintained with the collecting bank. Behring
sued for conversion of the funds in the accounts. The bank attempted to
defend on the ground of negligence on the part of Behring in allowing the
check to get into the wrong hands and on the ground that Nordship had
apparent authority to negotiate the check. The court ruled against the bank
on both contentions. 178  Because the bank had no legal basis on which to
exercise a set-off, the court rendered judgment on the conversion claim in
171. Id. The court distinguished Tubin v. Rabin, 382 F. Supp. 1983 (N.D. Tex. 1974),
supplemented, 389 F. Supp. 787, affid, 533 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1976). The Tubin court held
that a collecting bank was liable to the owner of a check because the special indorsement on
the check was forged. The distinction made by the court appears to be incorrect as the basis
for the distinction was not at issue in the Tubin case. This point is moot, however, because
Tubin was a federal case interpreting an undecided issue of state law and is not a controlling
precedent on the Texas courts.
172. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.417(a)(1), 4.207(a)(1) (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon 1968). Both sections provide that a person obtaining payment warrants good title to
anyone who pays or accepts the instrument. Id.
173. 675 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
174. TEX, Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.405 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
175. See id. §§ 3.202, .417(a)(1), 4.207(a)(1).
176. 675 S.W.2d at 317-18.
177. 662 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ).
178. Id. at 652.
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favor of the plaintiff. 179
Forgery of Drawer's Signature. If a bank pays an item on which the drawer's
signature has been forged, the payment is improper, and the drawer can
compel the bank to recredit the item to his account. 8 0 If the drawer has
been negligent in handling his checkbook or bank statements, however, the
bank may be able to avoid the claim for recrediting.' 8' In First National
Bank v. Hackworth 182 the jury found the drawer negligent in permitting em-
ployees to have access to her checkbook and bank records.183 The jury also
found, however, that the bank had not acted in accordance with reasonable
commercial standards in paying the checks. ' 84 The court held that the prox-
imate cause of the loss was the bank's improper action rather than the
drawer's negligence, and the bank was required to recredit the account. 85
An interesting and important sidelight to this case was that the action
against the bank was maintained by the drawer's estate because the drawer
died after suit was filed. In her original complaint the drawer had included a
deceptive trade practices claim 86 against the bank. The court held that the
claim, whether or not valid, did not survive the death of the drawer. 8 7
Payments on Restrictive Indorsements and Unauthorized Signatures. In La
Sara Grain Co. v. First National Bank'88 the bank paid several corporate
checks that bore the signature of only one corporate officer instead of the
two signatures required. The bank also accepted for deposit to the account
of an individual checks that were restrictively indorsed in the corporate
name. The bank defended on the basis that the corporation had failed to
complain about these erroneous payments within the one-year time period
specified in section 4.406 of the Code. 189 The court first held that the signa-
tures on the checks were unauthorized because two signatures were required
on checks drawn against the corporate account.' 90 The court further held,
however, that the bank did not pay the items in good faith because it had the
179. Id.
180. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.401, 4.401 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
181. Id. §§ 3.406, 4.406.
182. 673 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ).
183. Id. at 223.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 224.
186. This claim was asserted under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.50 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
187. 673 S.W.2d at 221. In another forgery case, First Nat'l Bank v. Shockley, 663 S.W.2d
685 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no writ), a bank customer obtained a default judgment
against a bank to compel the recrediting of the customer's account. The judgment included
claims for violation of the TDTPA and was affirmed on appeal. Id. at 689-91. The preceden-
tal value of this decision is uncertain, however, because the court properly noted that, as an
appeal on a default judgment, all allegations in the petition were to be taken as true and a cause
of action was sufficiently stated. Id. at 687.
188. 673 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. 1984).
189. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.406(d) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) (customer who
fails to discover and report unauthorized indorsement on paid item within one year of when
bank made item available is barred from action against bank).
190. 673 S.W.2d at 562.
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information necessary to determine that two signatures were required on
corporate checks and to determine that various items had been indorsed re-
strictively. 91 Because of the failure to act in good faith, the court ruled that
the one-year limitation in section 4.406 was not available as a protection to
the bank. 192
Stopping Payment on Money Orders. For many years Texas law under the
Code has provided that neither the issuing bank nor the customer can stop
payment on a cashier's check. 193 In Interfirst Bank Carrollton v. Northpark
National Bank, 194 a case of first impression in Texas, the court held that the
same rule applies to personal money orders purchased from a bank.195 The
court termed a personal money order analogous to a bank money order, thus
warranting the treatment accorded a cashier's check. 196
Recovery of Bank Payments by an Action in Restitution. In a very interesting
decision, Greer v. White Oak State Bank,197 the Texarkana court of appeals
decided that a collecting bank was entitled to recover an amount paid to its
customer in a restitution action even though the bank had lost its right to
charge back against the customer because of undue delay in giving notice of
dishonor. 198 The court reasoned that the Code neither displaces nor con-
flicts with the equitable right of restitution and that such an action could be
maintained unless the customer had changed position in reliance on the pay-
ment. 199 In support of its position, the court cited Bryan v. Citizens National
Bank,2°° in which the Texas Supreme Court outlined the scope of a restitu-
tionary recovery under the Code for payor banks.201
B. Bank Collections
Immunity of Federal Reserve Banks. In Childs v. Federal Reserve Bank 20 2
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held a Federal Reserve bank immune
from suit by the owner of an item even though the bank may have been
191. Id. at 562-63.
192. Id. at 563; see also TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.406(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
1968) (customer must use reasonable care and promptness to examine statement and discover
unauthorized signature on any item).
193. See Wertz v. Richardson Heights Bank & Trust Co., 495 S.W.2d 572, 574 (Tex. 1973).
194. 671 S.W.2d 100 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1984, no writ).
195. Id at 103.
196. Id.
197. 673 S.W.2d 326 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1984, no writ).
198. Id. at 329. A right of charge-back on dishonored checks is provided for collecting
banks under TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.212(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). The right
is lost if the bank fails to give notice of dishonor to its customer by the bank's midnight
deadline.
199. 673 S.W.2d at 329.
200. 628 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1982).
201. As outlined by the supreme court, a payor bank is entitled to restitution of money
paid by mistake only if it shows that its customer had a valid defense to payment of the item.
Id. at 762-63. Both Bryan and Greer may be usefully compared with National Say. & Trust
Co. v. Park Corp., 722 F.2d 1303 (6th Cir. 1983). National Savings contains an excellent
review of the theory of restitution by banks. Id. at 1305-06.
202. 719 F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1983).
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negligent in handling a check in the collection process. 20 3 Although section
4.201 of the Code makes each collecting bank an agent or sub-agent of the
depositor, 204 Regulation J of the Federal Reserve System severs any agency
relationship with depositors and thereby prevents depositor actions against
Federal Reserve banks. 20
C. Rights of Set-Off
Set-Off Against FDIC on Loan Participations. Because of the increasing
number of bank failures, a growing area of banking law has involved the
rights of banks that purchase loan participations to set-off the participated
loans when the bank originating the participations becomes insolvent.20 6
Because the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) acts as the re-
ceiver of the insolvent bank, the attempted set-off is made against the FDIC.
In Interfirst Bank Abilene v. FDIC207 the federal district court allowed a
participating bank to set-off loan participations against a correspondent ac-
count belonging to an insolvent bank when the claims were in existence
before the insolvency, the amount of the claims was certain, and the claims
were made in a timely manner.20 8
V. LETTERS OF CREDIT
Interpretation of a Letter of Credit. A letter of credit is interpreted according
to the rules of construction applied to ordinary contracts. 20 9 In Insurance
Co. of North America v. Cypress Bank 210 the terms of a letter of credit re-
quired "a statement to the effect that [the beneficiary has] not received evi-
dence satisfactory to [it] of the performance of all the conditions and
obligations of the aforesaid bond. ' 21 1 The beneficiary's letter stated that it
had not received satisfactory evidence of the performance of the principal
under a bond. The court ruled that reasonable minds could not differ on the
compliance of the letter with the terms of the credit and entered judgment
for the plaintiff as a matter of law.212
Drafts Under a Credit Can Include Nonnegotiable Drafts. Under a credit
203. Id. at 814.
204. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.201 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
205. Regulation J, 12 C.F.R. § 210.6(a)(1) (1984).
206. See, e.g., FDIC v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 701 F.2d 831 (9th Cir. 1983)
(set-off permissible only because note purchase agreement contained provision that nothing in
agreement should be deemed a waiver of bank's right of set-off); First Empire Bank v. FDIC,
634 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1980) (when debt of closed bank is set-off against bank's deposit in
another bank, only balance of deposit over set-off is an asset of receivership); FDIC v. Grella,
553 F.2d 258 (2d Cir. 1977) (if nondisturbance agreement offered to receiver by landlord was
unconditional, receiver could not maintain action on basis of insolvent bank's interest in lease).
207. 590 F. Supp. 1196 (W.D. Tex. 1984).
208. Id. at 1200.
209. Republic Nat'l Bank v. Northwest Nat'l Bank, 578 S.W.2d 109, 115 (Tex. 1978).
210. 663 S.W.2d 122 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983), reformed, 674 S.W.2d 781
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ).
211. 663 S.W.2d at 124.
212. Id. at 125.
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that required the beneficiary to draw on the credit by sight drafts drawn
against the issuer, the Texas Supreme Court held that the beneficiary com-
plied with the credit when it presented nonnegotiable drafts. 2 13 The court
noted that section 3.104(c) of the Code 2 14 does not require instruments to be
negotiable to qualify as drafts.2 15 Had the issuer so desired, a term limiting




A. Creation of Security Interests
Common Law Security Interests in Bank Accounts. Under section 9.104 of
the Code security interests in deposit accounts are excluded from coverage
under chapter 9 unless the account contains proceeds. 2 17 According to the
court in San Felipe National Bank v. Caton,2 18 even though chapter 9 ex-
cludes a security interest in a deposit account, the parties, by agreement,
may create a common law security interest in such an account.2 19 In Caton
a note given by a debtor in exchange for a loan gave the bank a security
interest in all money on deposit with the bank. The note also provided that
this security interest was in addition to any other interests that the debtor
gave the bank. The court held that the note gave the bank a common law
lien created by contract that would be recognized as a valid equitable
claim. 220 This common law security interest gave the bank priority to the
accounts as against the claim of a judgment creditor who obtained a writ of
garnishment against the funds of the judgment debtor held by the bank. 22 1
The recognition of common law security interests raises some intriguing
questions. Is the right to create such a security interest limited to the bank
in which the funds of a debtor may be kept?2 2 2 Must such a security interest
be created by writing, or will an oral agreement suffice?22 3 What sort of pri-
ority does the common law security interest have in relation to a chapter 9
213. Temple-Eastex Inc. v. Addison Bank, 672 S.W.2d 793, 797-98 (Tex. 1984).
214. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.104(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). Section 3.104
gives the requirements for a negotiable instrument and defines as species of negotiable instru-
ments certain drafts, checks, certificates of deposit, and notes. Id.
215. 672 S.W.2d at 797.
216. Id. at 798.
217. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.104(12) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
218. 668 S.W.2d 804 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ).
219. Id. at 805.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. The court in Caton suggested that the bank's interest "was similar to that of pledgor
and pledgee." Id. If a bailee can hold property for the benefit of someone other than the
bailor, limiting the creating of such common law security interests to the depository bank
would seem unnecessary. Cf TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 9.305 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
Supp. 1984) (for most kinds of collateral, a security interest may be perfected by possession,
and if such collateral is held by a bailee, a secured party is deemed to have possession from the
time that the bailee receives notification of the secured party's interest).
223. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.203 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1984), permits




security interest asserting a right to the account as proceeds? 224 What are
the relative priorities of a common law security interest against competing
claims when the loan transaction involves future advances or after-acquired
property?225 This situation will almost always occur with a deposit account
since deposits and withdrawals will probably be made from time to time.
Caton opens some interesting issues that will undoubtedly arise in future
litigation in the area of secured transactions.
B. Priorities
Purchase Money Security Interests in Inventory. In Ford Motor Credit Co. v.
First State Bank226 the Texas Supreme Court held that a creditor who first
files a financing statement against inventory collateral is entitled to notice
from a later purchase money lender if the purchase money lender is to obtain
priority over the earlier security interest.227 A lower court had theorized
that such notice was not required when the earlier secured party had filed a
financing statement covering inventory, but had not yet entered into a secur-
ity agreement with the debtor creating a security interest in the inventory as
collateral. 228 The Texas Supreme Court rejected this theory on the ground
that the security interest attached on the date of the filing of the financing
statement. 229 The supreme court decision represents a commendable recog-
nition of the purpose of a notice filing system under which a creditor can file
a financing statement to give notice of a possible interest even when the de-
tails of a transaction have not been completed. 230 Such a system is workable
only when the rights and conduct of the parties are evaluated in light of the
records on file within the system.
C Proceedings After Default
Transfer of Collateral Under a Repurchase Agreement. The normal course of
events after a default under chapter 9 is the repossession of collateral by the
secured creditor and the disposal of the collateral by sale231 or by retention
of the collateral in satisfaction of the debt.232 A third alternative, by means
of transfer under a repurchase agreement, is rarely used in comparison to
sale or retention. 233 This alternative is available if a person other than the
debtor is liable to the secured party under a guaranty, indorsement, or repur-
chase agreement, and that person receives a transfer of collateral from the
224. See id. §§ 9.104(12), .105(a)(5).
225. See id. §§ 9.204, .312, for the Code treatment of these issues.
226. 676 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. 1984).
227. Id. at 487.
228. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. First State Bank, 674 S.W.2d 437, 441 (Tex. App.-Tyler
1984), rev'd per curiam, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 80 (Nov. 7, 1984).
229. 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 81.
230. Some discussions of the Code system of notice filing may be found in TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 9.402 comment 2 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
231. See id. § 9.504(c).
232. Id. § 9.505.
233. See id. § 9.504(e).
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secured party following default. 234 Under an agreement of this kind, the
secured party is not required to dispose of the collateral by sale or retention,
but may compel the guarantor, indorser, or repurchaser to acquire the prop-
erty according to the terms of their agreement. The Code specifically pro-
vides that a transfer of collateral under a repurchase agreement "is not a sale
or disposition of the collateral under this chapter. '235 The rules concerning
repurchase agreements were applied in Ley v. Main Bank236 to permit recov-
ery for breach of contract against parties who were liable to the secured
creditor under a repurchase agreement. 2 37 Because transfer under a repur-
chase is not a disposition of collateral, the rule of Tannenbaum v. Economics
Laboratory, Inc. 238 is not applicable.
Disposition of Collateral. In contrast to transfer of collateral under a repur-
chase agreement, a secured party who disposes of collateral must follow the
standards for notice and commercially reasonable disposition in section
9.504 of the Code.239 A failure to give the proper notices or dispose of the
collateral in a commercially reasonable manner will bar the secured party
from recovering a deficiency24° and may result in liability for damages or
penalties.2 4 1 In First City Bank v. Guex2 4 2 the Texas Supreme Court held
that a debtor was entitled to recover ten percent of the principal amount of
the original note and the entire amount of the finance charge as a penalty
under section 9.507243 when the secured party failed to dispose of the collat-
eral according to the standards set out in the Code. 244 The court further
held that the debtor was entitled to recover attorney's fees because the action
arose out of a contract between the secured party and the debtor.245
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. 665 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
237. Id. at 181.
238. 628 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. 1982). Under Tanenbaum a secured party who fails to dispose
properly of collateral is barred from recovering a deficiency against the debtor. Id. at 772.
239. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.504(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1984). Similar
standards are applicable if collateral is retained in satisfaction of the debt. See id. § 9.505.
240. Tanenbaum v. Economics Laboratory, Inc., 628 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex. 1982).
241. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.507 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1984). Sec-
tion 9.507 gives a debtor a right to recover from a secured party for any loss caused by the
secured party's failure to comply with requirements of article 9 such as notice, commercially
reasonable disposition, and accounting for any surplus. Id.
242. 677 S.W.2d 25 (Tex. 1984).
243. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.507 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
244. 677 S.W.2d at 29-30.
245. Id. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon Supp. 1984), permits recovery of
attorney's fees in actions based on contract.
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